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AbstrAct
In this paper, we argue that hard incompatibil-
ism imperils a typical component of loving re-
lations—lovable behavior—if it imperils moral 
praiseworthiness. We propose that to be lov-
able behavior, the behavior must exemplify the 
property of being commendable (the property 
of being praiseworthy from the standpoint of 
love), in contrast to being morally praiseworthy 
(praiseworthy from the point of view of moral 
duty). but if hard incompatibilism undermines 
moral praiseworthiness, then it just as surely 
undermines commendability. Thus, hard in-
compatibilism imperils a crucial component of 
loving relationships.
Key words: hard incompatibilism, moral re-
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1. Introduction
Derk Pereboom has recently advanced a 
powerful defense of a position in the free 
will debate that he dubs “hard incompati-
bilism.” According to this position, with 
the exception of agent-causal accounts 
of free action or moral responsibility, 
no compatibilist or libertarian account 
is true. Pereboom further proposes that 
since there are no good reasons to believe 
that we are agent-causes, we are, in effect, 
without free will. A significant supple-
ment to Pereboom’s hard incompatibilism 
is that, contrary to what many have as-
sumed, a life devoid of free action would 
not be as detrimental as it has often been 
made out to be and, in certain respects, 
such a life would even be beneficial 
(Pereboom 1995; 2001; 2002). Pereboom, 
for instance, argues that though lack of 
this freedom undermines appraisals of 
moral praise- and moral blameworthi-
ness, its absence leaves intact other sorts 
of moral appraisal, such as appraisals of 
moral obligation, right, and wrong, is no 
bar to developing an acceptable position 
on managing criminal behavior and on 
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moral education and reform, and fails to affect significantly interpersonal relationships, 
including those of love, and “life-hopes.”1 Pereboom, in effect, theorizes that fully ap-
preciating hard incompatibilism reveals that this position is not such an exacting one 
after all.
In this paper, we take issue with an element of the supplement. We argue that a typical 
component of loving relationships—lovable behavior—is imperiled by hard incompati-
bilism. We may tentatively identify such behavior with behavior that is motivated by 
love. Our discussion will be concerned not so much with hard incompatibilism’s im-
pact on love, as with its impact on lovable behavior, love being an essential constituent 
of loving relations and loving behavior being, characteristically, a part of loving rela-
tions. Accordingly, we will not give a definition of love, nor deal with the nature of the 
different varieties of love.
In roughly hewn strokes, our line of reasoning for the view that hard incompatibilism 
threatens lovable behavior may be summarized in this way: to be lovable behavior, the 
behavior must exemplify the property of being commendable (the property of being 
praiseworthy from the standpoint of love), in contradistinction to, for instance, being 
morally praiseworthy—praiseworthy from the point of view of moral duty. but hard 
incompatibilism undermines commendability just as it undermines moral praisewor-
thiness. Thus, hard incompatibilism imperils a crucial component of loving relation-
ships.
2. Hard incompatibilism
It will be helpful to commence with a brief overview of some of the key elements of hard 
incompatibilism. Pereboom argues that moral responsibility for an action depends pri-
marily on the action’s actual causal history and not on whether its agent could have 
avoided performing it. so in Pereboom’s estimation incompatibilism is not motivated 
by the thought that determinism expunges alternative possibilities without the having 
of which no action can be free. rather, Pereboom proposes that it is considerations 
concerning an action’s causal origin or source that undergirds incompatibilism.
Elaborating, Pereboom submits that we can describe cases in which a victim of manip-
ulation, such as a subject whose decisions are the product of antecedent elements—val-
ues, desires, and beliefs, for example—which neuroscientists surreptitiously implanted 
in her, is not free and, hence, is not morally responsible for her behavior. A causal his-
tory involving apt manipulation, a “manipulated causal history,” undermines freedom 
and responsibility. In such cases, owing to the agent’s not being the ultimate source of 
her action (mental or otherwise), the agent is not morally responsible for the action. 
1 For a view similar to the view that some important “life-hopes” must be abandoned if determinism is true but 
that other life-hopes that matter to us can be retained, see Honderich 1988; 1993; 2002.
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More specifically, the pertinent principle to which Pereboom appeals to support his 
verdict of unfreedom and non-responsibility in scenarios involving responsibility-sub-
versive manipulation is this:
Principle O: If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an 
action, then the production of this decision must be something over which the 
agent has control, and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is 
produced by a source over which she has no control. (Pereboom 2001, pp. 4, 47)
A deterministic causal history, Pereboom contends, is pertinently like a manipulated 
one: an action that is causally determined issues from sources—the distant past and the 
natural laws—over which the agent lacks any control. contrary to compatibilists, Pere-
boom proposes that there is no relevant and principled difference between an action 
that results from responsibility-undermining manipulation and an action that has a 
more ordinary deterministic causal history. It follows that compatibilism is not sustain-
able (Pereboom 2001, pp. 89-126; 2002, p. 478).
regarding libertarian accounts not wedded to agent-causation, Pereboom ventures that 
an indeterministic event-causal history, a history not including agent-causation and in 
which various antecedents of an action, such as the agent’s having of reasons, indeter-
ministically cause elements in the action’s etiology or the action itself, is not relevantly 
different from a manipulated one: this sort of history, also, undermines responsibility. 
This is because in scenarios involving indeterminism, just as in those involving deter-
minism, antecedents over which the agent lacks any control produce the action. Again, 
Pereboom’s position is that no relevant and principled difference can distinguish an 
action that results from responsibility-undermining manipulation from an action that 
has a more ordinary indeterminsitic causal history (Pereboom 2002, p. 478). He con-
cludes that such libertarian theories are doomed to go the way of compatibilist ones.
Only agent-causation, Pereboom believes, allows for free action and moral responsibil-
ity. Agent-causation is coherent, but given evidence from our best scientific theories, it 
is not credible that we are in fact agent-causes. We, therefore, do not have the freedom 
that moral responsibility demands (Pereboom 2001, pp. 69-88).
3. Love in hard incompatibilist worlds
Pereboom submits, as we have noted, that although hard incompatibilism undermines 
moral praise- and blameworthiness, it leaves intact love and loving relations. Pereboom 
has several interesting things to say about why hard incompatibilism does not endanger 
these things. The following passage is especially noteworthy:
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Is it plausible that loving another requires that she be free in the sense required 
for moral responsibility? One might note that parents love their children rarely, 
if ever, because these children possess this sort of freedom, or because they freely 
(in this sense) choose the good, or because they deserve to be loved. Moreover, 
when adults love each other, it is also seldom, if at all, for these kinds of reasons. 
Explaining love is a complex enterprise. besides moral character and action, 
factors such as one’s relation to the other, her appearance, manner, intelligence, 
and her affinities with persons or events in one’s history all might have a part. but 
suppose we assume that moral character and action are of paramount importance 
in producing and maintaining love. Even if there is an important aspect of love that 
is essentially a deserved response to moral character and action, it is unlikely that 
one’s love would be undermined if one were to believe that these moral qualities 
do not come about through free and responsible choice. For moral character and 
action are lovable whether or not they merit praise. Love of another involves, 
most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking on many of the aims and 
desires of the other as one’s own, and a desire to be together with the other. Hard 
incompatibilism threatens none of this. (Pereboom 2001, p. 202)
One may, however, have preliminary suspicions about whether various elements of 
loving relations that are deemed important remain secure in a world that is a hard 
incompatibilist world. so, for one thing, just as there are moral obligations, so there are 
“obligations” or commitments from love’s standpoint. We believe that it is intrinsically 
good when moral obligations are fulfilled and it is, fundamentally, in virtue of this fact 
that doing moral right for right’s sake and shunning what is morally wrong is of intrin-
sic value and so valuable to us. but, surely, if it is good when moral right is so done, the 
presumption is that some particular moral obligation is freely fulfilled—one does not 
fulfill it as a result of, say, manipulation.
turning to love, roger Lamb proposes that as a lover, you are, among other things, 
obligated from love’s standpoint to attend to requests of the beloved, help the beloved, 
be concerned with the welfare of the beloved, and to defend the trust that is partly con-
stitutive of the love (Lamb 1997b, pp. 28-29). We propose that just as it is good when 
moral right is done, so it is good when love’s obligations—obligations or commitments 
from love’s standpoint—are fulfilled. but if fulfilling such obligations is good, again 
the background presumption is that these obligations are freely fulfilled. The pertinent 
sense of ‘free’ is the sense in which our decisions, for instance, are required to be free if 
we are to be morally responsible for them. but then the free fulfillment of love’s obliga-
tions is something that hard incompatibilism undermines (or, for present concerns, so 
we are assuming).
For another thing, one constituent of the complex relationship that is a relationship of 
love is the trust that characteristically exists between the lover and the beloved. typi-
cally, when there is love, there is supreme or unquestioning trust. Laurence Thomas, 
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for example, claims that one of the distinguishing marks of friendship—and by exten-
sion, love—is the bond of mutual trust between friends. This he thinks “is cemented 
by equal self-disclosure and for that very reason, is a sign of the very special regard 
which each has for the other” (Thomas 1987, p. 217). Dean cocking and Jeanette Ken-
nett, take issue with Thomas’s proposal that self-disclosure—the confiding of private or 
intimate information—between friends, cements bonds of mutual trust. but they agree 
that trust and intimacy are pivotal in friendship (cocking & Kennett 1998). but again 
it seems, at least prima facie, that the trust, with its attendant emotional attitudes, must 
be free if it is to be deemed of value. And again, freely trusting each other is something 
that hard incompatibilism undermines.
For yet another thing, we value loving relations partly in virtue of the affective intensity 
or warmth that love requires.2 Niko Kolodny tenders a recent incarnation of this view. 
Kolodny explains that
to say that A is emotionally vulnerable to b…is to say, in part, that A is disposed 
to have a range of favorable emotions in response to A’s beliefs that b…has fared 
or will fare well, and a range of unfavorable emotions in response to A’s beliefs 
that b…has fared or will fare poorly. For example, A may feel content when b is 
well, elated when b meets with unexpected good luck, anxious when it seems that 
b may come to harm, grief-stricken when b does. (Notice that A is not simply 
emotionally vulnerable to how b treats A, although this is often what is meant by 
saying that one person is “emotionally vulnerable” to another). (Kolodny 2003, 
p. 152)
If, though, hard incompatibilism undermines the freedom of our decisions, it also un-
dermines the freedom of our feeling states. This is because such feeling states, if free, 
are only indirectly so: they derive their freedom from the freedom of prior elements 
to which they are aptly causally related and that are directly free.3 (These antecedent 
elements are directly free in that they do not derive their freedom from the freedom of 
anything else.) It is plausible that these temporally prior causal elements from which 
events that are indirectly free derive their freedom are (the having of) decisions. It 
would seem, consequently, that Pereboom’s relevant views on freedom imply that there 
is no principled, relevant distinction between states of emotional vulnerability being 
causally determined and such states being the product of manipulation. If the emo-
tional vulnerability that love implicates is to be of value to us, it cannot, it appears, be 
vulnerability of the sort that is engineered into us. Why would anyone value this sort 
of vulnerability?
2  see, for example, Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, book IX, ch. 5, 1166b30-1167a12 (and also book IV, ch. 6, 
1126b20ff.) and Oakley 1992, pp. 58-59.
3  see, for example, Mele 1995, p. 106 and Oakley 1992, pp. 122-159.
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so we do think that there are initial, tentative reasons to be somewhat skeptical of the 
view that hard incompatibilism has no detrimental influence on central components 
of loving relationships. Even if love itself does not succumb to hard incompatibilism, 
there are reasons to believe that hard incompatibilism imperils lovable behavior. We 
said above that we may tentatively identify such behavior with behavior that is mo-
tivated by love. If hard incompatibilism endangers lovable behavior, then since such 
behavior is, typically, a pivotal ingredient of loving relationships, hard incompatibilism 
threatens such relationships even if it does not threaten love itself. In what follows, we 
develop one line of reasoning to kindle this skepticism, a line of reasoning that requires 
unearthing a connection between commendability and lovable behavior. It is to this 
connection that we now turn.
4. Commendability and lovable behavior
to understand the view that lovable behavior is behavior for which its agent is com-
mendable, we need to clarify the notion of commendability and we need to address 
what species of behavior we have in mind when we speak of lovable behavior. toward 
these ends, we start with a distinction. Along the lines bernard Williams suggests, we 
may differentiate between a narrow conception of morality in which the morally de-
ontic notions of obligation, right, and wrong are primary, and a broader conception 
in which morality’s ambit extends beyond obligation to, roughly, concerns of how one 
should live.4 Morality, broadly construed, includes, for example, concerns of love or an 
ethics of virtue or care. Henceforth, we shall reserve the use of “morality,” or “moral,” 
or related expressions for the narrow conception. concerning this conception, we use 
“acting from duty” and “acting from moral obligation” interchangeably.
We previously registered that just as duty imposes requirements—there are obligations 
of duty or moral obligations—so love imposes requirements—there are obligations of 
love. One might, as a first approximation, identify lovable behavior with behavior in 
which one would engage if one were to discharge the duties of love. but as we shall 
argue, it is important to distinguish between lovable behavior proper and ersatz lovable 
behavior. Either variety of behavior is behavior in accordance with love’s requirements; 
the former sort of behavior, though, is behavior for which its agent is commendable.
to secure a preliminary understanding of commendability, we call to mind that an 
agent can act from love in the absence of any thought to the morally deontic con-
siderations of right, wrong, or obligation. such moral factors may be entirely on the 
sidelines, playing no causal role at all in the generation of the agent’s conduct that is 
consonant with the requirements of love, such as attending to the requests of the be-
loved. Love’s requirements may conflict with morally deontic requirements. In cases of 
4  see Williams 1985, pp. 6, 174-196. For this distinction, see also Mackie 1977, pp. 106-107.
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such conflict, the agent need not be morally praiseworthy for doing what love requires 
but may, nevertheless, be (as we have been saying) “commendable” from the standpoint 
of love, commendability being an analogue of moral praiseworthiness. similarly, hav-
ing acted in light of the belief that she has discharged her moral obligation, though not 
morally blameworthy, an agent may nevertheless be “censurable” from the perspective 
of love, censurability being an analogue of moral blameworthiness. commendability 
or censurability is a genuine variety of responsibility distinct from the moral variety. 
Again, bear in mind the identification of the moral with the deontically moral. In our 
terminology, commendability (or censurability) from the point of view of love is a non-
moral albeit normative variety of responsibility.5 In the remainder of this paper, “com-
mendability,” “censurability” or cognates of the two are terms referring to appraisals of 
normative responsibility from the point of view of love.
to amplify further the notions of commendability and censurability, we expound the 
concept of normative responsibility. An agent is normatively responsible for something 
if she is either normatively blame- or praiseworthy for that thing. starting with norma-
tive blameworthiness, there are different species or varieties of such blameworthiness.6 
A person can, for example, be morally, love-wise, or prudentially and so normatively 
blameworthy for intentionally doing or failing to do something or for the consequences 
of her intentional actions or omissions. Normative blameworthiness is concerned, pre-
eminently, with a certain sort of appraisal of a person and only derivatively with the 
appraisal of the person’s behavior. When a person is normatively blameworthy for an 
action, the blame in question is inward in that the person is deserving of blame, and 
not “outward.” Outward blame includes the outward expression of blame by words, 
gestures, or actions, and if well substantiated, presupposes blameworthiness.
Normative blameworthiness is closely tied to what a person deeply cares about. Fre-
quently (but not without exception) it is associated with normative standards a person 
thinks important and, hence, follows in guiding his life and conduct. construe “norma-
tive standards” liberally. On this expansive interpretation, dictates of custom or tradi-
tion, or imperatives deriving from projects or ideals of central importance to one’s life, 
count as such standards. Further, for a set of dictates, ideals, or rules to qualify as appro-
priate normative standards that “ground” normative responsibility, the standards must 
both guide and constrain behavior; they carry, in the person’s life, a sort of authority. A 
person who accepts a set of standards as normative, is motivated to act in accordance 
with those standards, believes that they provide reasons for action, and is disposed to 
have (appropriate) pro or con feelings or attitudes under various conditions in which 
the standards are implicated in some fashion. Often (but again not always), when an 
agent is normatively blameworthy for a course of conduct, the agent does something 
5  On varieties of normative responsibility, see Haji 1998, pp. 177-196.
6  Much of what we have to say on normative blameworthiness will also apply, with suitable amendments, to nor-
mative praiseworthiness.
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she takes to be under par, or below the cared-for normative standards on which she 
typically relies to arrive at practical judgments about what to do. As an illustration, an 
agent may do something in violation of prudential standards to which she is committed 
and with which she identifies. she identifies with these standards insofar as she cares 
more for them than for others such as those of morality or love; it is to these standards 
she would like her behavior to conform. It is in virtue of the agent’s having done some-
thing below par that it is frequently fitting, in instances of normative blameworthiness, 
for the agent to have negative feelings or attitudes (such as regret, or remorse) and for 
other parties to adopt appropriate negative attitudes toward her; but such feelings on 
the part of the agent or others are not essential to normative blameworthiness.
It is also worth reemphasizing that the guiding standards with which an agent identifies 
need not be (deontically) moral. An agent may deliberately evade what she recognizes 
to be a moral obligation, and intentionally execute some alternative she considers more 
significant, perhaps because it is the prudentially rational course of action, and because 
it is prudential standards to which she bears allegiance.7 Deliberate deviation from such 
standards may leave the agent susceptible to blame, but the blame will not be moral. We 
make no presumption that people generally endorse a single set of ideals or standards 
that guide and constrain behavior across all “domains” of life. One may, with respect 
to certain concerns, act out of love, but with respect to others, act from moral duty, or 
from the imperatives of one’s religion.
The positive correlate of normative blameworthiness is normative praiseworthiness. 
Ponder an example involving commendability, a judgment of commendability being a 
judgment of non-moral normative praiseworthiness. Imagine that a mother visits her 
sick child in hospital. she sees her child for no other reason than that she loves him and 
cares for his well-being. The belief, occurrent or dispositional, that it is morally right 
or morally obligatory for her to visit her child plays no role whatsoever in the etiology 
of her action or behavior—her visiting her child. Any such moral belief fails to enter 
into her deliberations (if she deliberates at all) about whether to visit her child; nor 
in any way does she entertain any moral belief in visiting her child. We submit that 
the mother is not morally deserving of praise for visiting her child. Or suppose that, 
without hesitation, the mother gives up one of her kidneys to her child who would not 
otherwise survive. Assume that she acts out of love and not moral duty or any sense 
of moral concern. Then, again, the loving mother is not morally praiseworthy for giv-
ing the kidney. but she is commendable. she gives up her kidney, roughly, on the basis 
of the belief that this is what she ought to do. “Ought” in this last sentence does not 
signal any moral duty or imperative. rather, it denotes an obligation, or at least some 
prescriptive element like a duty or a deep commitment, associated with acting out of 
love that is somewhat analogous to what one takes to be one’s moral obligation when 
7  Michael slote develops an interesting example in which a father deliberately does something he believes to be 
morally wrong—he misleads the police about his son’s whereabouts—taking the verdict of parental love to do 
whatever he can to save his offspring, to override the verdict of morality (slote 1983, p. 86).
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one acts in light of the belief that one morally ought to do something. The “obligation” 
here, then, signifies an imperative stemming from the appropriate normative standard 
from which the mother acts when she gives up her kidney. The standard, in this case of 
hers, is not a moral one.
As for the notion of lovable behavior—we use “lovable” and “loving” behavior inter-
changeably—we have the following in mind. refer to intentional behavior that is in 
accordance with love’s requirements but that is behavior (an intentional action, for ex-
ample) for which its agent is not commendable as “loving* behavior” (or as “a loving* 
action”) or, if one wants, as “ersatz loving behavior.” Assessments of love’s requirements 
or prohibitions are assessments of behavior that are “act-focused”; such assessments are 
first and foremost normative appraisals of the behavior and not appraisals or apprais-
als only derivatively of its agent. Assessments of commendability, in contrast, just like 
assessments of moral praiseworthiness, are primarily “agent-focused”; they are fun-
damentally normative appraisals of the agent and not, in the first instance, appraisals 
of the pertinent behavior. Our position is the following. to be behavior that is loving 
behavior, the behavior must be expressive of love. (Hence, the initial tentative gloss that 
lovable behavior is behavior that is motivated by love.) to be expressive of love, its agent 
must be commendable for the behavior; the behavior must be reflective of the loving 
attitude of the agent toward the beloved. Thus, loving behavior, as we understand it, is 
behavior that is in accordance with the requirements of love and for which its agent is 
commendable.
We now explain the view that lovable behavior is behavior for which its agent is com-
mendable by elucidating the value lovable behavior has for us.
5. On lovable behavior’s being valuable
We value several of the components that collectively are constitutive of relationships of 
love. We value love, for instance, whether love is an attitude, or a moral emotion, or a 
relationship, or yet something else. but we value lovable behavior as well. so far, we have 
used “valuable” and its cognates in a loose, intuitive sense. It is time to tighten up.
The notion of being valuable is broadly construed as an amalgam of a strict sense of 
“being valuable” and a derivative sense of this term: something is valuable to, or im-
portant for, an agent if it is good in relation to the agent in some sense of “good”. That 
is, it is valuable or good, (i) first, if it is worthy of being valued—it is worthy of being 
something toward which the agent is favorably disposed. The agent has favorable at-
titudes, including emotional attitudes, toward it. (This is the strict sense of “valuable”.) 
(ii) second, it is worthy of being judged good; the agent values it in the sense of judging, 
finding, or believing it to be good.8 (This is the derivative sense of “valuable”.)
8  see, for instance, Zimmerman 2001, pp. 2-3. strictly, we should distinguish between something’s being (strictly) 
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In this section, we motivate the thesis that the value of lovable behavior for us is essen-
tially a function of our being commendable for the behavior. This thesis is to be under-
stood as implying the following. First, as we have proposed, behavior is lovable behavior 
(or genuinely lovable behavior) only if its agent is commendable for the behavior. If an 
agent’s actions are in accordance with the requirements of love but the agent is not 
commendable for those actions, then the prior implicate yields the result that the be-
havior will not be lovable behavior proper and, hence, it will be behavior that is devoid 
of the value we typically associate with loving behavior. second, it is in virtue of pos-
sessing the feature of being commendable that lovable behavior is especially valuable. In 
brief, we judge lovable behavior to be good, partly but pivotally, in virtue of the fact that 
commendability is essential to a bit of behavior that is an instance of lovable behavior.
The stance toward which we are working is this: given the notion of being valuable at 
issue, if loving behavior is good—it is behavior worthy of our having appropriate favor-
able attitudes toward it—and we take such behavior to be good, then such behavior is 
important to us; it is of value to us. There is little reason to believe that, generally, people 
are favorably disposed toward loving* behavior; such behavior is not typically behavior 
worthy of our having favorable attitudes toward it. People do not, for example, gener-
ally, take delight in engaging in loving* behavior. In addition, there is little reason to 
believe that people typically find loving* behavior to be good. There is, thus, little rea-
son to believe that loving* behavior is good in one fundamental respect in which loving 
behavior is good: we take delight in the fact that we engage in the latter sort of behavior 
but, generally, we do not take pleasure in engaging in the former sort of behavior. In 
sum, there is little reason to sustain the view that loving* behavior is good and that 
people take loving* behavior to be good. It follows that loving* behavior is not (typi-
cally) of value to us. It is loving behavior proper, behavior that entails commendability, 
which is valuable to us. roughly, it is the agent’s “proper (loving) investment” in a bit of 
loving behavior that we cherish so deeply.
The thought, that loving* behavior, that is, again, behavior in accordance with the re-
quirements of love but unaccompanied by commendability, is not the sort of behavior 
we have in mind when we think of loving behavior as valuable, may be developed, in a 
preliminary fashion, by reflecting on Pereboom’s remarks on love that we cited previ-
ously: love of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking 
on many of the aims and desires of the other as one’s own, and a desire to be together 
with the other. One may wish well for the other because one believes that this is morally 
or prudentially required of one. similarly, one can take on many of the aims of the other 
as one’s own, or generate desires to be together with the other, or sustain such desires, 
because one believes that this is what morality requires. but what we would then value 
in such behavior, if we value it at all, would not be anything like what we value in loving 
valuable, and something’s being (strictly) valuable for a person. The distinction is of no consequence in the discus-
sion to follow.
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activity. What we find valuable in behavior of this sort, insofar as such behavior is genu-
inely loving behavior, is that the relevant agent—the lover, for instance—is commend-
able for the behavior. The behavior expresses the cares or nuances of love. to elaborate, 
we remarked that when one loves another, one is typically concerned for the other. The 
concern may express itself in sundry ways, many behavioral. Insofar as the concern is a 
concern of love—insofar as the behavior that expresses the concern is genuinely loving 
behavior—what is done to manifest the concern, it seems, causally stems appropriately 
from love and not, for example, from duty or prudence—the behavior must be behavior 
for which one is commendable. Adapting an example of bernard Williams, the spouse, 
saved by the husband who declares that he rescued his wife partly in view of the fact 
that that is what love required of him, but who failed to act on the basis of the belief that 
love constrained him to act in the way in which he did and, so, who failed to act “out 
of ” love, would be just as put off as she would have been had her husband informed her 
that he acted solely from moral duty in saving her. The husband acted in conformity 
with the requirements of love, but not being commendable for his behavior, we would 
be hard pressed to regard his behavior as loving.9
cocking and Kennett propose that a close friend—a lover, for instance—is receptive to 
being directed and interpreted by the other. They explain that when one is directed in 
the characteristic way, “one’s choices are shaped by the other and one’s interests and ac-
tivities become oriented toward those of the friend” (cocking & Kennett 1998, p. 504). 
In an example that they develop, on the basis of one’s receptivity to being directed by 
one’s friend’s interests, one accepts the friend’s invitation to the ballet even though one 
has no interest and will never have any real interest in the ballet. In acting out of love 
or friendship, one does not go begrudgingly or out of any sense of moral obligation. 
Yet again, though, we would not find anything of value commensurable to what we find 
of value in loving behavior, if one were to go to the ballet but not be commendable for 
doing so.
reflecting on receptivity to being interpreted by the other, cocking and Kennett ad-
vance the following case.
consider how we often recognize and highlight aspects of our close friend’s 
character. so, for example, Judy teasingly points out to John how he always likes 
to be right. John has never noticed this about himself; however, now that Judy 
has pointed it out to him he recognizes and accepts that this is indeed a feature 
of his character. seeing himself through Judy’s eyes changes his view of himself. 
but beyond making salient an existing trait of character, the close friend’s 
interpretation of the character trait or foible can have an impact on how that 
9  Here is Williams’ original example: “but this construction provides the agent with one thought too many: it 
might have been hoped by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be 
the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is permissible to save 
one’s wife” (Williams 1976, pp. 214-215).
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trait continues to be realized. Within the friendship, John’s liking to be right may 
become a running joke which structures how the friends relate to each other. 
John continues to insist that he is right; however, his insistences are now for 
the most part treated lightheartedly and take on a self-consciously ironic tone. 
And John may be led by Judy’s recognition and interpretation of his foibles to 
more generally take himself less seriously. Thus, John’s character and his self-
conception are also, in part, drawn, or shaped, by his friend’s interpretations of 
him. (cocking & Kennett 1998, p. 505)
If Judy were not commendable for bringing the indicated foible to John’s attention, we 
would suspect that she is not acting out of friendship or love. Her behavior, at best, 
would qualify as ersatz lovable behavior. Analogously, suppose John reacts to Judy’s 
activities in the way in which cocking and Kennett describe in the passage. Again, if 
John were not commendable for the pertinent behavior that comprises his reactions, 
we would have good grounds to believe that he did not act out of love or friendship. His 
behavior would be devoid of what we find valuable in loving behavior.
What, though, about cases in which one loves seemingly without exhibiting any overtly 
behavioral manifestations of love? For what, in such cases, is the agent commendable? 
David Velleman, for instance, brings attention to scenarios that suggest cases of the 
relevant sort:
[s]urely, it is easy enough to love someone whom one cannot stand to be with. 
Think here of Murdoch’s reference to a troublemaking relation. This meddlesome 
aunt, cranky grandfather, smothering parent, or overcompetitive sibling is 
dearly loved, loved freely and with feeling: one just has no desire for his or her 
company…. In the presence of such everyday examples, the notion that loving 
someone entails wanting to be with him seems fantastic indeed. (Velleman 1999, 
p. 353)
similarly, Velleman suggests:
I think that one can love a person without having the faintest notion of what that 
person’s interests are, and without having any inclination to discover or promote 
them. One may feel unworthy to serve the beloved’s interests, or powerless to 
serve them, or forbidden from serving them by social circumstances or ethical 
constraints. One may love a colleague or student in ways that one is not entitled 
to express in benevolent action. One may love a teacher or mentor without 
ever presuming to imagine that one might further his interests. There are even 
loving friendships, I think, in which respect for one’s friend rules out any acts of 
unsolicited benevolence. (Velleman n.d., p. 18)
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cases such as these, though, do not present any substantial difficulty to the thesis at 
issue. surely, a person may express loving feelings and may well be commendable for 
expressing such feelings. Or if, as Velleman believes, “love is essentially an attitude to-
ward the beloved himself but not toward any result at all” (Velleman 1999, p. 354), 
there is nothing, in principle, to stand in the way of the person’s being commendable 
for the attitude or appropriate constituents of it. Indeed, as Michael Zimmerman has 
forcefully argued, if we do not conflate the scope of moral responsibility—roughly, the 
things for which an agent is morally responsible—with degree of moral responsibil-
ity—roughly, the extent to which a person is morally responsible—then there is nothing 
untoward about a case in which the scope of, say moral praiseworthiness, diminishes 
to naught but in which the degree of such praiseworthiness remains the same as what it 
is in an otherwise similar case in which the scope of moral praiseworthiness is signifi-
cant (Zimmerman 2002). There is no reason to think that commendability differs from 
moral praiseworthiness in this respect. Thus, a person can be commendable for her 
loving attitude although she does not in any way overtly manifest this attitude in loving 
behavior; and she can be commendable for it to the same extent as she would have been 
had her attitude found expression in loving behavior.
In summary, should we be taken to task to clarify the general line of reasoning to sus-
tain the thesis that what we find valuable in loving behavior is essentially a function of 
our being commendable for the behavior, we oblige with the following. First we distin-
guish between behavior that is merely in accord with the requirements of love (ersatz 
lovable behavior) and genuinely loving behavior. We record the truism that we typi-
cally value the latter but not the former. The explanation of why we customarily value 
the latter is, again, the relatively straightforward one that it is lovable behavior that is 
characteristically valued. We then ask what it is about such behavior in virtue of which 
it qualifies as lovable behavior proper as opposed to qualifying merely as ersatz lovable 
behavior. We take our cue from suggestions such as the following. When an agent en-
gages in ersatz lovable behavior, this behavior does not express the cares or concerns of 
love; the behavior need not causally stem from desires for the good of the other for the 
other’s own sake;10 or the behavior does not generally express the “investments” of love, 
such as taking on many of the aims and desires of the person who is loved as one’s own. 
We propose that underlying these suggestive reflections is the unifying view that lov-
able behavior (however thoughtful or reckless) is behavior for which its agent is com-
mendable. If an agent is commendable, for example, for an action, then she performs 
that action at least partly on the basis of the belief that that is what love requires that she 
do. given that all other conditions of commendability, such as freedom-relevant condi-
tions, are satisfied, the agent will be commendable for this action.
10 O. H. green argues that love is not an emotion but a complex conative state, a set of desires. regarding romantic 
love, he claims that A loves B if and only if A desires to share an association with B which typically includes a 
sexual dimension, A desires that B fare well for his or her own sake, and A desires that B reciprocate the desires for 
association and welfare (green 1997, p. 216).
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We conclude that there are good reasons to believe that the thesis that ties the value of 
lovable behavior to commendability merits serious consideration.
6. On hard incompatibilism’s influence on lovable behavior
We may now revert to why hard incompatibilism imperils lovable behavior, behavior 
which it is agreed is habitually a vital component of loving relationships. We have seen 
that according to Pereboom, if a person is morally praise- or blameworthy for a mental 
action, such as a decision or a choice, the production of the decision must be something 
over which the agent has control, and the agent is not morally responsible for the deci-
sion if sources over which she has no control ultimately produce it (Pereboom 2001, 
pp. 4, 47; 2002, p. 478). On Pereboom’s view, this principle—Principle O—captures a re-
quirement of “ultimate sourcehood” for moral responsibility. Pereboom calls events for 
which factors beyond the agent’s control determine their occurrence alien-deterministic 
events and those that are not produced by anything at all truly random events. He adds 
that the “range of events between these two extremes—for which factors beyond the 
agent’s control contribute to their production but do not determine them, while there 
is nothing that supplements the contribution of these factors to produce the events—
[may be referred to as] partially random events” (Pereboom 2001, p. 48). With respect 
to moral blameworthiness, Pereboom claims that to “be blameworthy is to deserve 
blame just because one has chosen to do wrong. Hard incompatibilism rules out one’s 
ever deserving blame just for choosing to act wrongly, for such choices are always alien-
deterministic events, or truly random events, or partially random events” (Pereboom 
2001, p. 140). Hard incompatibilism undermines moral praiseworthiness for similar 
reasons. We may summarize the relevant view in this manner: according to Pereboom, 
hard incompatibilism undercuts moral praise- and blameworthiness because hard in-
compatibilism precludes our ever being ultimate originators of any of our actions.
but now consider the pertinent view concerning censurability—blameworthiness from 
the point of view of love—that Pereboom would presumably endorse: To be censurable 
is to deserve blame from love’s standpoint just because one has chosen to do what love for-
bids. It would seem that if one accepts the view that hard incompatibilism rules out our 
ever deserving moral blame (or moral praise) just for choosing to act morally wrongly 
(or as we morally ought to) because we are never the ultimate originators of such choic-
es, then one should equally accept the view that hard incompatibilism rules out our 
ever deserving blame (or praise) from love’s standpoint just for choosing to act wrongly 
(or as we are obligated to), where these deontic assessments of wrong or obligation are 
assessments from the point of view of love. This is because, again, we are never the ulti-
mate originators of such choices. More succinctly, if there is a requirement of ultimate 
origination for moral praise- and blameworthiness, then, in the absence of convincing 
reason to believe otherwise, there should be such a requirement for commendabil-
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ity and censurability as well. so, if hard determinism undermines moral praise- and 
blameworthiness, then it undermines commendability and censurability as well.
7. Conclusion
Let us take it, then, that hard incompatibilism undermines the truth of judgments or 
ascriptions of normative responsibility from love’s standpoint if it undermines the truth 
of such judgments or ascriptions from morality’s standpoint. If what we value, though, 
in loving behavior is essentially a function of being commendable for such behavior, 
contrary to Pereboom, hard incompatibilism will also undermine relations of love. The 
“lovable behavior” that remains intact in hard incompatibilist worlds is ersatz lovable 
behavior and not lovable behavior proper. given that lovable behavior is, typically, a 
key component of loving relationships, the “relations of love” that stay undamaged in 
such worlds are at most ersatz relations of love.
One may inquire into whether hard incompatibilism undermines loving relationships 
by inquiring into whether this brand of incompatibilism undermines love itself. If love 
is a moral emotion, or if it is to be analyzed in terms of a set of desires, then, on this 
strategy, one would explore whether hard incompatibilism has a detrimental effect on 
the pertinent emotion or desires. In this piece, we have by and large not enlisted this 
strategy. We have opted for an alternative that counsels looking closely at what com-
prises lovable behavior and then examining whether hard incompatibilism imperils 
such behavior. We have argued that hard incompatibilism does indeed threaten this 
component of loving relationships.
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